Psychological Model of the Budgetary Process by Soulier, Mary T.
Woman C.P.A. 
Volume 42 Issue 1 Article 2 
1-1980 
Psychological Model of the Budgetary Process 
Mary T. Soulier 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/wcpa 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Soulier, Mary T. (1980) "Psychological Model of the Budgetary Process," Woman C.P.A.: Vol. 42 : Iss. 1 , 
Article 2. 
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/wcpa/vol42/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It 






Mary T. Soulier, Ph.D *
*The author would like to thank Don T. DeCoster of the Univer­
sity of Washington for his comments and assistance in the pre­
paration of this paper.
Budgets are one of the major tools 
used by management to express a 
plan of action and to control ac­
tivities by contrasting actual efforts 
with the plan [Welsch, 1971]. 
However, because management 
control systems are created by peo­
ple for planning and controlling peo­
ple’s activities, they cannot be 
viewed as only an accounting tech­
nique. For the budgeting process to 
be effective the budgeter must be 
aware of both the organization’s 
policies and structures and how the 
operating personnel interact with the 
planning and control process.
The importance of these variables 
is underscored by management’s in­
terest in such management control 
systems as management by objec­
tives, participative budgeting, and 
responsibility accounting [Giblin 
and Sanfilippo, 1978]. Yet, the im­
pact of these systems on the in­
dividuals being controlled can be so 
negative that the system must be 
phased out because of hostility. In 
spite of reported difficulties [Newton, 
1977], management has no choice 
but to continue to seek planning and 
control systems that will increase the 
organization’s efficiency and effec­
tiveness. The problem is to ensure 
that the management control 
systems do not leave the organiza­
tion in worse shape than it was 
before implementation. As one man­
ager reported after a budgetary 
system implementation failure, “We 
thought management really meant it 
when they said they wanted partici­
pative budgeting, and everyone got 
into act in developing their depart­
mental budgets. Imagine our dis­
satisfaction when they rejected our 
departmental budgets and imposed 
their own budgets. In fact, we lost 
several excellent people as a result.”
A great deal of literature exists 
concerning budget pressure, partici­
pative management, organizational 
conflict, budgetary communication, 
and budgetary slack [DeCoster, 
1975; Said, 1978]. The consensus of 
this literature is that the appropriate 
budgetary system and its implemen­
tation techniques are dependent 
upon organizational structure, man­
agement strategies, corporate goals 
and objectives, leadership style of 
top management, and employee at­
titudes, to name a few variables. This 
can leave the budget director in the 
quandary of how best to evaluate a 
management control system to 
assure that it facilitates the achieve­
ment of organizational goals in an 
efficient and effective manner.
A Framework for Analysis
The budget officer needs to pre­
dict the impact of the management 
control system on the personnel’s at­
titudes and behavior. This entails 
dealing with the processes the man­
ager uses to infer the causes of ob­
served behavior, both his/her own 
and others. The question is: “What 
causes do managers assign to a par­
ticular success or failure, either their 
own or that of a subordinate’s?” This 
question is based on the belief that 
the individual forms expectations of 
success or failure on future tasks 
based upon the causes which were 
assigned as the results of past suc­
cesses or failures [Weiner, 1970].
In a budgetary situation, the pro­
cess of assigning causes formally 
begins with the receipt of the budge­
tary report comparing budgeted and 
actual performance. The manager 
then uses all available information 
including personal observations, 
contacts, and control system reports 
to draw conclusions about the 
causes of the success or failure of 
the performance. Finally, the in­
dividual makes a decision about 
future behavior based on the 
analysis [Frieze, 1976; Weiner, 
1972].
For example, assume that a man­
ager receives an accounting report 
indicating a negative performance. 
Then, assume that the manager 
assigns the causes of the failure to 
too tight a budget or insufficient 
technical skills, rather than to lack of 
effort. The expectation of the in­
dividual would be that, regardless of 
future effort, the probability of suc­
cess on similar tasks in the future 
would be very low. There will be little 
reason for the manager to increase 
effort toward the task performance. 
If, however, the manager assigns the 
cause of failure to an inappropriate 
allocation of time or lack of effort, 
then increased effort next period 
might result in the successful 
achievement of budgetary goals.
Three areas are of particular in­
terest to the person setting budge­
tary goals:
1. The information sought by the 
individual to determine the 
causes of the success or failure.
2. The grouping of causes used by 
people; and
3. The effect of choosing specific 
causes on future behavior.
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A Model of Budgeting
Exhibit 1 develops a model that is 
relevant to the budgetary process. In 
this model the budgetary process 
begins with a translation of 
organizational goals into an opera­
tional budget (point A). This budget 
may be either imposed by manage­
ment or developed with the partici­
pation of the subordinates. In ac­
tuality, these two methods are proba­
bly on opposite ends of a continuum 
of budgetary practices with most 
budgets having some combination 
of both. It is through the operational 
budget that the subordinate obtains 
information concerning the 
superior’s expectations of accepta­
ble performance. It is also a state­
ment of how the individual can 
achieve personal goals; that is, rec­
ognition, the opportunity to partici­
pate in future decisions, promotion, 
and monetary compensation.
After actual performance the con­
trol phase begins (point B). During 
this phase the first step, from the 
subordinate’s perspective, is the 
evaluation (interpretation) of per­
formance as a success or failure. In 
a budgetary setting, this comes in 
the form of both formal and informal 
feedback. Formal feedback would 
come through a comparison of a per­
formance budget with the actual per­
formance data. The resulting 
variances are evidence of the suc­
cess (zero or positive variances) or 
failure (negative variances) of meet­
ing the budget. This is shown at 
point C in Exhibit 1. As an example, 
assume that an audit manager had a 
performance time budget of 100 
hours to accomplish a specific job. 
When the actual hours of work were 
totaled they were 20 percent above 
budget; an unfavorable report.
As a next step this audit manager 
would use available information to 
determine why this failure happened. 
The information sought can be 
grouped into three classes of ques­
tions. These questions group how a 
person assesses the way current 
behavior and results fit in with pre­
vious behavior and results to create 
an historical pattern. In our example 
of an unfavorable time variance the 
first question would be, “How am I 
doing on different types of jobs?” 
The second question has to do with 
performance on the same type of job 
across time. That is, “Have I received 
other unfavorable variances on this 
4/The Woman CPA, January, 1980
type of job?” The third compares the 
particular performance of the man­
ager with other managers; “How do 
other managers do on this job?”
These three questions help the 
person decide if the performance 
behavior was caused by factors 
within the individual (e.g., a person’s 
skill, personality, and/or effort) or 
factors external to the individual 
(e.g., a different task, biased 
measures, and/or bad luck). If the 
audit manager has done well on 
most other jobs, has done well on 
similar jobs, or if almost everyone 
else who has worked on this job has 
had unfavorable variances, a cause 
external to the manager would be 
implied. If, on the other hand, the 
audit manager is doing poorly on 
most other jobs, on other jobs of a 
similar nature, and other managers 
are doing well on this job, a cause 
internal to the manager would be in­
ferred.
Researchers have grouped per­
ceived causes of success or failure 
along two dimensions: (a) internal­
external (control), and (b) stable- 
unstable (stability). These two 







The dimension of control refers to 
whether the cause was thought of as 
internal or external to the individual 
performing the task. Ability, abnor­
mal effort, and attitudes are all ex­
amples of internal causes; job 
difficulty, luck, and behavior of peers 
are causes external to the individual. 
The stability dimension refers to the 
tendency of the causes to be 
unchanging over time. For example, 
personal ability and the tightness of 
the budget would remain constant 
for the individual in the short run. On 
the other hand, the level of individual 
effort could be modified from one ac­
counting period to the next.
While there are many possible 
causes that could be assigned to 
success or failure, research has 
shown that it is possible to condense 
them into these four major catego­
ries: ability level, the amount of effort 
expended, the difficulty of the tasks, 
and the amount and direction of 
luck. These four categories, ex­
plored in detail in successive sec­
tions, have a direct impact upon 
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In assigning either internal or 




As stated earlier, the control 
dimension pertains to whether the 
cause of the success/failure was 
perceived as internal (ability and 
effort) or external (task difficulty and 
luck) to the individual performing the 
job. In assigning either internal or 
external causes, there is a likelihood 
of superior/subordinate bias. For ex­
ample, the audit manager with the 
unfavorable variance would likely 
choose causal factors such as a 
poor control system, biased 
measurement systems, a more com­
plex job than originally planned 
resulting in too tight a budget, un­
cooperative colleagues, inex­
perienced staff, and unforeseen and 
unavoidable events such as acts of 
God. These are all external causes. 
On the other hand, the supervisor of 
the audit manager would more likely 
assign internal causes such as little 
supervisory experience, an abrasive 
personality, lack of technical skills, 
too little effort, or a nonprofessional 
attitude toward the task. These are 
all internal causes. The extent of this 




The stability dimension pertains to 
the likelihood that the causes can be 
changed, at least in the short run. If 
past behavior on a job was attributed 
by the audit manager to the stable 
factors of ability and/or task 
difficulty, there would be little expec­
tation that in the short run results 
would change. If the outcomes of the 
previous performance were ascribed 
to the unstable elements of luck or 
effort, expectations of suc­
cess/failure can change. Therefore, 
shifts in expectancies of the in­
dividual are primarily determined by 
the stability of the cause.
At the point of determination of 
causes, shown as point D in Exhibit 
1, a combination of ability, task 
difficulty, effort, and luck will be 
chosen as causes of behavior. The 
audit manager will assign causes to 
the control and stability dimensions 
with some weighting of importance 
dependent, in part, upon the suc­
cess/failure results. These historical 
causes are then used to form new ex­
pectations. In this way the historical 
causes help explain the manager’s 
views of past performance while 
simultaneously affecting future 
behavior.
If the audit manager in our exam­
ple chose the causal factors of poor 
production systems, uncooperative 
colleagues, too tight a budget, inex­
perienced staff, or lack of proper 
training on his/her part, the causes 
could be grouped under the stable 
dimensions of ability and task 
difficulty. The audit manager could 
be expected to make the logical 
deductions that faced with these 
conditions again on a similar job, 
there would be the same results of 
unfavorable time variances. And, 
since these factors will not change 
in the short run, the audit manager 
would not likely increase effort. If, 
however, the manager had chosen 
an unstable factor, such as lack of 
effort, s/he might logically conclude 
that increased personal effort would 
lead to a favorable variance next 
time. Here, the audit manager would 
likely increase effort next time. Cer­
tainly this is of interest in the budge­
tary control process since it can be a 
useful way of predicting future 
behavior of managers as well as a 
way of examining superior/subord­
inate conflicts.
Policy Implications
Research from social psychology, 
organization theory, and behavioral 
accounting support the validity of 
this framework [Soulier, 1978]. There 
is evidence to show that:
1. People do assign causes to 
results which affect their future 
expectations;
2. The causes can be grouped 
along the two dimensions of 
control and stability;
3. There is bias in choosing 
causes of behavior; that is, the 
manager will more likely 
assign external causes while 
the superior will more likely 
assign internal causes.
4. Individuals who receive success 
feedback will more likely 
choose internal causes (deci­
sion-making ability and effort) 
and be more satisfied while 
those receiving failure feedback 
will more likely choose external 
causes (task difficulty and luck) 
and be less satisfied.
Success/Failure Implications
The policy implications of 
research findings on success/failure 
feedback using the framework 
developed are startling since they 
contradict many of the motivational 
assumptions made in budgetary 
literature. The literature often sug­
gests that budgets should be set at 
levels achievable 25 to 40 per cent of 
the time to achieve maximum per­
formance. According to the frame­
work developed above, people who 
receive continuous or frequent 
failure feedback increasingly assign 
more external causes of task 
difficulty and bad luck. As a result 
their expectancies of future success 
decrease. The manager would not 
expect to succeed and probably 
would put forth less effort; there 
would be no reason to work harder. 
Importance and Satisfaction
The literature suggests that failure 
feedback also has the impact of 
causing managers to lower their 
psychological importance of suc­
cessful task performance. This is the 
exact opposite of the effect desired 
when giving feedback. Instead of 
motivating the manager to work 
harder to accomplish the job in the 
budgeted time, the negative feed­
back will cause the individual to 
decrease the psychological impor­
tance of the task to themselves.
In addition to affecting psy­
chological importance, success or 
failure feedback can also affect 
manager satisfaction. Research has 
shown that when failure occurs, the 
individual has decreased levels of 
satisfaction. The model developed 
above offers provocative insights to 
this situation. The decreased 
satisfaction is not because the in­
dividual attributes the failure to inter­
nal factors that can be improved 
upon. Rather, it occurs because the 
individual attributes the failure to ex­
ternal factors which implies that the 
individual has lost control of the 
situation.
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The budgetary process really 
starts with the assignment of 
causes for last period’s 
success or failure and the 
behavioral expectations 
arising from the causes.
Manipulation of Success 
or Failure
These findings have obvious 
policy implications. First, manage­
ment is likely to create dissatisfac­
tion among subordinates when 
budget levels are set so high that the 
majority of feedback is negative. 
Since success and failure are 
defined in relationship to the 
benchmarks budgeted at the begin­
ning of the accounting period, they 
are judgmental criteria of perform­
ance that become absolute values. A 
failure in one situation can be 
changed to a success by simply 
changing the benchmark data. 
Satisfaction is not directly depen­
dent on the absolute level at which 
the budget was set; rather it depends 
upon whether the individual believes 
s/he was successful in job ac­
complishment.
However, an additional problem 
may arise. As the individual believes 
s/he is more successful, higher 
levels of effort will be perceived in 
reaching successful task ac­
complishment. From a management 
point of view this is a two-edged 
sword. If the budget is set so high 
that the individual receives failure 
feedback, the individual will assume 
lack of personal control, decrease 
expectancies of future successes, 
lower the level of effort, and 
decrease satisfaction. But, on the 
other hand, if management sets the 
budget levels lower so that success 
feedback will be prevalent, in­
dividuals will take more personal 
credit for the results, increase expec­
tancies of future successes, perceive 
themselves as putting forth more 
effort, and become more satisfied. 
This seems desirable; but in putting 
forth more effort, theories of equity 
say that the individual is going to ex­
pect more rewards. Yet this would be 
unjustified unless the success feed­
back was based upon valid in­
creases in the firm’s effectiveness 
and efficiency. Certainly, the setting 
of acceptable budget levels appears 
to be an art, not a science.
Another implication is important to 
the budget director. Too often the 
budget process is defined as begin­
ning with the definition of the budget 
goals and ending when the control 
reports are presented and acted 
upon. This overlooks the obvious — 
the budgetary process really starts 
with the assignment of causes for 
last period’s success or failure and 
the behavioral expectations arising 
from the causes.
Conclusions
There is no doubt that the budget 
director must continue to seek ways 
of understanding and explaining the 
interaction of the human being with 
the budget system. The failure to 
seek answers to these human ques­
tions can lower the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the budget, and 
ultimately the firm. The model 
developed can offer new insights in 
evaluating specific budgetary policy 
decisions.
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